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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, sixty-seven-year-old Shepherd Reale pleaded
guilty to felony sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age. The district court
imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed. The district court
also ordered Mr. Reale to pay the parents of the victim $4355.68 in restitution.
On appeal, Mr. Reale asserts that substantial evidence did not support the award
of $3315.68 in restitution for lost wages of the mother of the victim, because the award
was for time the mother spent resting instead of going to work. Whether a district court
may award "lost wages" restitution for the time a victim spent resting

of going to

work
of first impression. Mr. Reale also asserts that the district court abused its discretion
when it imposed his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Eight-year-old M.S. reported that Mr. Reale had rubbed her chest and vaginal
area through her clothing while she was at his house. (Conf. Exs., p.37.) 1 M.S. also
stated that Mr. Reale had kissed her mouth, bare neck, bare chest, and bare stomach,
and that she had seen his "privates." (Conf. Exs., p.37.) When Officer Edward Gates of
the Jerome Police Department contacted Mr. Reale, he gave the officer full access to
his medical records from the VA Medical Center in Boise. (Conf. Exs., p.37.) He did
not want to tell Officer Gates anything for fear of wording it incorrectly.

(Conf. Exs.,

p.37.) The VA medical records indicated that Mr. Reale voluntarily admitted himself

1

All citations to the Confidential Exhibits refer to the 89-page PDF electronic document.
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girl. . . "

, p.37 (internal quotation

marks omitted).
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Reale had committed the crime
of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen years of age, felony, in violation of Idaho
Code§ 18-1508. (R., pp.9-10.) The State later filed an Amended Criminal Complaint
alleging Mr. Reale had committed one count of felony lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen years of age, and one count of felony sexual abuse of a child under sixteen
years of age.

(R., pp.47-48.)

After Mr. Reale waived a preliminary hearing, the

magistrate bound him over to the district court. (R., pp.57, 59-60.) The State then filed
an Information charging Mr. Reale with one count of lewd conduct and one count of
sexual abuse.

(R., pp.63-64.)

Mr.

initially

charges. (R., p.70.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Reale subsequently agreed to plead guilty to
the sexual abuse count, and the State agreed to dismiss the lewd conduct count.
(R., p.92.) The district court accepted Mr. Reale's guilty plea. (R., p.93.)
The State then filed a Restitution Request, asking for an award of $391.35 to the
Idaho Industrial Commission's Crime Victim's Compensation Program (CVCP).
(R., pp.96-99.) Later, the State filed an Amended Restitution Request, asking for an
award of $698.65 to the CVCP and an award of $10,260.00 to Kathryn Shepard and
Carter Shepard, the parents of M.S. (R., pp.100-04.) The total requested restitution of
$10,958.65 broke down as follows:
CVCP

CARES Examination
St. Luke's Clinic Examination
Total

$307.50
$391.35
$698.65

The Shepards

Kathryn Shepard Lost Wages
Carter Shepard Lost Wages

$3220.00
$1000.00
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Mileage: 80 Miles At $0.50
Tuition For Failed

ile

$40.00
$6000.00

(See R., p.100.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State recommended that the district court impose
a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years fixed.

(Tr., p.40, Ls.17-23.)

Mr. Reale recommended that the district court place him on probation. (Tr., p.46, L.24 p.48, L.15.) The district court then imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
three years fixed. (R., pp.110, 112-18.) Mr. Reale filed a Notice of Appeal timely from
the district court's Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.124-26.)
At the subsequent restitution hearing, the

based upon the testimony of the

Shepards, requested a modified total restitution award of $11,862.68.
Ls.16-19.)

(Tr., p.106,

The increase came from the State's request for $3315.68 instead of

$3220.00 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages, $1200.00 for private school tuition, and $167.00
for child care expenses. (See Tr., p.106, L.20 - p.107, L.6; State's Ex. 1.)
Ms. Shepard's requested lost wages were from when she missed part or all of
her 12-hour shifts as a night charge nurse on the nights before scheduled counseling
sessions or court proceedings. (See Tr., p.72, L.13 - p.86, L.15; State's Ex. 1, p.1.)
She reported that she missed a total of 92 hours of work, at an hourly rate of $36.04, for
a total of $3315.68. (State's Ex. 1, p.1.) Ms. Shepard represented that she missed part
or all of her shifts because she wanted to be "rested" for the court proceedings.
(Tr., p.83, Ls.19-24.) Mr. Reale asserted, with respect to those requested lost wages,
that it was not foreseeable "that someone would miss a 12-hour shift the night before a
court hearing in order to be there for that hearing in the morning." (Tr., p.110, Ls.1821.)
3

the restitution hearing, the district
Restitution. (R., pp.140-47.) The district court

its
Ms. Shepard

lost wages, and awarded Mr. Shepard $1000.00 for lost income.

15.68 for

(R., p.144.)

The

district court also awarded the Shepards $40.00 for mileage expenses for driving M.S.
to her CARES interview and physical examination. (R., p.144.)
However, the district court denied the Shepards' request for $1200.00 for M.S.'s
private school tuition, because they enrolled M.S. in a private school to prevent future
harm and the tuition expenses were thus not recoverable as restitution.

(R., p.145.)

The district court also denied Mr. Shepard's request for $6000.00 for repayment of his
student loans, because there was insufficient evidence to establish a causal nexus
between Mr. Reale's conduct and the repayment of the loans, which would have to be
repaid in any event. (R., p.145.)
In the Judgment/Order of Restitution, the district court awarded CVCP a total of
$698.65 and the Shepards a total of $4355.68. (R., pp.148-150.)

4

ISSUES
1.

Did substantial evidence support the
Ms. Shepard for lost wages?

restitution

award

of

15.68 to

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Reale following his plea of guilty to
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The Restitution Award Of $3315.68 To
Ms. Shepard For Lost Wages

A

Introduction
Mr. Reale asserts that substantial evidence did not support the restitution award

of $3315.68 to Ms. Shepard for lost wages, because the award was for time she spent
resting instead of going to work. Alternatively, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting
instead of going to work is awardable as restitution for lost wages, substantial evidence
did not support the full award of $33·15.68.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
A district court has discretion over the decision whether, and in what amount, to

award restitution, guided by the factors set forth in l.C. § 19-4304(7). State v. Corbus,
150 Idaho 599, 602 (2011 ). 'The issue of causation in restitution cases is a question of
fact to be decided by the trial court." Id. "The district court's factual findings with regard
to restitution will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence."
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion." Id.
Idaho Code § 19-5304 provides that: "Unless the court determines that an order
of restitution would be inappropriate or undesirable, it shall order a defendant found
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make restitution to
the victim."

I.C. § 19-5304(2).

"Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss

which the victim actually suffers." Id. The definition of "economic loss" includes "lost
6

as well as "direct

or

"

I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a).

loss shall be based upon the preponderance of evidence submitted to the
court by the prosecutor, defendant, victim or presentence investigator."

I.C. § 19-

5304(6).
"[l]n order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by
the victim."

Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602.

This is because Section 19-5304 permits

restitution for "any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim." I.C. § 195304(2).

Further, Section 19-5304 defines "victim" as a "directly injured victim which
economic loss or injury as the result of the

means a person or entity, who

defendant's criminal conduct and shall also include the immediate family of a
minor .... " I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added).
For purposes of criminal restitution, "causation consists of actual cause and true
proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,
374 (2009)).

"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event

produced a particular consequence."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[T]rue

proximate cause deals with whether it was reasonably foreseeable that such harm
would flow from the negligent conduct."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

"In

analyzing proximate cause, [the reviewing Court] must determine whether the injury and
manner of occurrence are so highly unusual that a reasonable person, making an
inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have
reasonably expect the injury to occur." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"An intervening, superseding cause," which is "an independent act or force that
breaks the causal chain between the defendant's culpable act and the victim's injury,"
7

generally "replaces the defendant's

as the proximate cause of the victim's injury."

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]o relieve a defendant of criminal liability, an

intervening cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence." Id. at 602-

03. "The defendant remains criminally liable if either the possible consequence might
reasonably have been contemplated or the defendant should have foreseen the
possibility of harm of the kind that could result from his act."

Id. at 603 {internal

quotation marks omitted).

C.

Substantial Evidence Did Not Support The Award Of $3315.68 For Lost Wages
To Ms. Shepard, Because The Award \/Vas For Time She Spent Resting Instead
Of Going To Work
Substantial evidence does not support the district court's award of $3315.68 for
to Ms. Shepard, because the award was for time she spent resting instead of

lost

going to work. As discussed above, Ms. Shepard represented that she missed part or
all of her shifts because she wanted to be "rested" for the court proceedings. (Tr., p.83,
Ls.19-24.)

The district court justified the award for lost wages on the basis that

Ms. Shepard "took off time for court so that she could be prepared for court if her
participation in the proceedings may be required. This is understandable given the fact
that she works evenings and would have little rest after her work day before attending
court." (R., p.143.) The district court also stated that, "It is not unreasonable for her to
take off time to be prepared for court. . . . [Ms. Shepard] took her time off in 4 hour
blocks and did her best to find coverage for her blocks of time to avoid taking off more
time than necessary to be prepared and attentive in court." (R., p.143.)
Whether a district court may award "lost wages" restitution for time a victim spent
resting instead of going to work is a question of first impression. Mr. Reale asserts that
Section 19-5304 does not contemplate awarding victims lost wages for taking time off
8

work to

rested or prepared

attending court proceed

Shepard, by

spending time resting instead of going to work, did not suffer an economic
analogous to lost wages. Her choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was
an intervening, superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's
criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages. Thus, substantial evidence does not
support the district court's award of $3315.68 for lost wages to Ms. Shepard.
A district court may award victims restitution for time spent attending court
proceedings (including travel time) instead of going to work. Thus, Ms. Shepard would
be "entitled to lost wages for time off that was reasonable to enable [her] to attend court
proceedings, including travel time."

State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521, :314 P.3d 203,

211 (Ct. App. 2013); State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 379 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a
victim company that sent its vice president to a restitution hearing suffered economic
loss as contemplated by I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a), because "the victim in this case lost the
full value of the time its vice president spent attending court proceedings"); State v.
Russell, 126 Idaho 38, 39 (Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam) (holding that "the time spent in
court by a self-employed victim during which that person could otherwise be pursuing
his vocation, but who has been called to testify about the losses caused to him through
criminal conduct of the defendant, has suffered an economic loss within the meaning of
I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a)").
Victims may request restitution for time spent attending court proceedings
instead of going to work because the loss suffered by victims through court attendance
is closely analogous to lost wages.

As explained above, the definition of "economic

loss" includes "lost wages." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a). By analogy to lost wages, the Russell
Court concluded "that the time spent in court by a self-employed victim during which
9

that person could otherwise be pursuing his vocation, but who has been

to testify

about the losses caused to him through criminal conduct of

suffered

an economic loss" for purposes of criminal restitution.

defendant,

Russell, 126 Idaho at 39

(emphasis added).
In view of Russell, the Olpin Court held that the victim company suffered
economic loss because it "lost the full value of the time its vice president spent
attending court proceedings."

Olpin, 140 Idaho at 379.

The victim company's

employees "were diverted from their normal duties to ... court attendance tasks as a
result of [the defendant's] offense." Id.
Later, the Houser Court discussed lost wages restitution for court
terms of missing work to attend court.

Houser, 1

Idaho at

, 314 P.3d

in
210.

While "a victim who attends court proceedings will necessarily miss work for longer than
the duration of the proceeding in his or her case" because of the vagaries of court
scheduling, "this uncertainty factor justifies presence at the courthouse only before a
proceeding begins, not after it ends." Id. at_, 314 P.3d at 210 (emphasis added).
Additionally, a victim's choice to miss work to attend court is foreseeable, not an
intervening, superseding cause.

The Houser Court held that the victim's "choice to

attend most, if not all, of the proceedings was not an intervening, superseding cause
that severed the causal link between [the defendant's] criminal behavior and [the
victim's] loss of wages." Id. at_, 314 P.3d at 210. This was because it was "not
unforeseeable" that a crime victim would want to attend and actually attend most or all
court proceedings, the importance of a given proceeding may not be evident to a victim,
and the importance of a proceeding to a victim may be different than the importance of
a proceeding to the disposition of a case. Id. at
10

, 314 P.3d at 210.

In contrast to the victims in Houser, Olpin, and Russell,

Shepard did not

request restitution for time spent attending court proceedings instead of going to work.
The district court recognized that "the court hearings in [Mr. Reale's] case were
generally held between 9:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. and that these hearings were not held
during [Ms. Shepard's] hours of work (7:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.)." (R., p.143.) She "took
off time for court so that she could be prepared for court if her participation in the
proceedings may be required." (R., p.143) Thus, Ms. Shepard requested restitution for
time spent resting instead of going to work, not time spent actually attending
court proceedings.
Shepard, by spending time resting instead of going to
economic loss analogous to lost wages.

did not suffer an

Unlike the victims in Houser, Olpin, and

Russell, Ms. Shepard did not miss work to attend court proceedings scheduled at the
same time as work. Thus, Ms. Shepard did not spend any time in court when she could
otherwise have been "pursuing her vocation." Cf. Russell, 126 Idaho at 39. Nor was
Ms. Shepard "diverted from [her] normal duties" to attend court. Cf. Olpin, 140 Idaho at
379. She did not "miss work" because of her "presence at the court." Cf. Houser, 155
Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 210.
Further, Ms. Shepard's choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was
an intervening, superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's
criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages. It was not reasonably foreseeable
that, as a result of Mr. Reale's criminal conduct, Ms. Shepard would miss work during
hours where no court proceedings took place.

See Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-03.

Rather, it is "unforeseeable and extraordinary" that a victim like Ms. Shepard, in order to

11

,;u,AJ\Aings, would

to miss work during hours where no court

proceedings took place. See id. at 602-03.

A reasonable person in Mr. Reale's position, "making an inventory of the
possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably
expected" Ms. Shepard to miss partial or entire shifts at work to attend court
proceedings that occurred not during, but after those shifts. Houser, 155 Idaho at_,
314 P.3d at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Corbus, 150 Idaho at 60405 (holding that a reasonable person in the defendant's position of driving dangerously
night would have reasonably foreseen that a passenger might have been injured after
jumping from the vehicle to escape the dangerous situation). Thus, her choice to spend
time resting instead of going to work was an intervening, superseding cause that
severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's criminal conduct and Ms. Shepard's loss of
wages. Cf. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 604-05; Houser, 155 Idaho at

314 P.3d at 210.

In sum, Section 19-5304 does not contemplate awarding victims lost wages for
time spent resting before attending court proceedings. Ms. Shepard, by spending time
resting instead of going to work, did not suffer an economic loss analogous to lost
wages. Her choice to spend time resting instead of going to work was an intervening,
superseding cause that severed the causal link between Mr. Reale's criminal conduct
and Ms. Shepard's loss of wages.

Thus, substantial evidence does not support the

district court's restitution award of $3315.68 to Ms. Shepard for lost wages, because the
award was for time she spent resting instead of going to work.

The district court's

restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages should be vacated and the
matter remanded for the entry of a new restitution order reducing the amount of
restitution awarded to the Shepards by $3315.68.
12

D.

Even If Ms. Shepard's Time Spent Resting Instead Of Going To Work . Is
Awardable As Restitution For Lost Wages, Substantial Evidence Did !'Jot Support
The Full Award Of $3315.68
Alternatively, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting instead of going to work is

awardable as restitution for lost wages because she suffered economic loss analogous
to lost wages and her choice to rest before attending court proceedings was
foreseeable as opposed to an intervening, superseding cause, substantial evidence did
not support the full award of $3315.68. Ms. Shepard requested restitution for five entire
12-hour shifts off work, as well as for several partial shifts off work. (State's Ex. 1, p.1.)
However, it was not reasonably necessary for her to take entire 12-hour shifts off work
before court proceedings.
or

the voluntary choices of the third party

who decided not to cover

entire 12-hour shifts constituted an

intervening, superseding cause that precludes a finding that Mr. Reale's criminal
conduct was the proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for the entire shifts.
"[l]n the absence of evidence of a justification, a court may not presume that loss
of an entire work day is justified for every attendance at a hearing regardless of its
duration or time of day." Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 214 P.3d at 211. "For example, an
individual wishing to attend a hearing that is scheduled for 9 a.m., together with
numerous other hearings, may have to wait from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m. before his or her
case is taken up by the court; but that would not necessarily justify taking the remainder
of the day off work if the hearing was concluded by noon." Id. at_, 214 P.3d at 210.
The record in Houser contained no evidence that the victim's employer did not
allow the victim to take partial days off work to attend court proceedings, which
undermined the district court's finding that uncertainty about hearing times caused the
victim to take entire days off work. Id. at

, 314 P.3d at 211. Because "[t]he State did
13

what portion of [the victim's] time

was reasonably necessary for his

attendance at the court proceedings and what portion, if any was caused by his
voluntary choice not to work for the remainder of the day," the Court held that "the
district court's award of restitution for entire days off work is not supported by
substantial evidence and must be vacated." Id. at

314 P.3d at 211.

Similarly, the evidence here indicates that Ms. Shepard could have taken, and
did take in some instances, partial shifts off work to be "rested" for the court
proceedings she attended. For example, she took four hours each off her shifts before
a CARES examination and three court proceedings. (State's

1, p.1.) Additionally,

Ms. Shepard took eight hours off work before, respectively, a CARES interview and one
court proceeding.

(State's

1, p.1.)

Ms. Shepard's taking partial shifts off work

suggests that it was not "reasonably necessary" for her to take entire 12-hour shifts off
work to be rested "for [her] attendance at the court proceedings."
Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 211.

See Houser, 155

In fact, Ms. Shepard appeared to prefer to not take

entire 12-hour shifts off work. {See Tr., p. 73, Ls.2-5.)
Ms. Shepard testified that the reason she missed her entire 12-hour shifts before
five court proceedings {see State's Ex. 1, p.1 ), was that she was unable to find anyone
to cover those shifts. (See Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5; p.82, Ls.11-19, p.83, Ls.16-18.) According
to Ms. Shepard, it was "kind of hard" to "find people to switch schedules with me."
(Tr., p.73, Ls.2-5.) The voluntary choices of the third party or parties who decided not to
switch

schedules and

cover Ms.

Shepard's shifts constituted

an

intervening,

superseding cause that precludes a finding that Mr. Reale's criminal conduct was the
proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for those entire 12-hour shifts. See
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602-03; Houser, 155 Idaho at

14

, 314 P .3d at 211. It was not

reasonably

that,

a result of Mr. Reale's criminal conduct, those third

parties would decline to cover Ms. Shepard's shifts. Cf. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 604-05;
Houser, 155 Idaho at_, 314 P.3d at 211. Thus, even if it were reasonably necessary

for Ms. Shepard to take partial shifts off work to attend court proceedings that occurred
after those shifts, the award of restitution for the entire 12-hour shifts off work was not
supported by substantial evidence.
In short, even if Ms. Shepard's time spent resting instead of going to work is
awardable as restitution for lost wages, substantial evidence did not support the full
award of $3315.68. It was not reasonably necessary for her to take entire 12-hour shifts
voluntary

of the

third party or parties who decided not to cover those shifts constituted an intervening,
superseding cause that precludes

finding that Mr. Reale's criminal conduct was the

proximate cause of Ms. Shepard's economic loss for those entire 12-hour shifts. Thus,
the district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages should be
vacated and the matter remanded for a new determination of the amount of
Ms. Shepard's lost wages proximately caused by Mr. Reale's criminal conduct.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Fifteen
Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Reale Following His Plea Of Guilty To Sexual
Abuse Of A Child Under Sixteen Years Of Age
Mr. Reale asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
sentence because his unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed, is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

The district court should have instead

placed Mr. Reale on probation as he recommended, or imposed a lesser sentence.

15

Where a defendant contends

the sentencing

harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review

the record

giving "due regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 {2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence." State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293,294 (1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Reale does not allege that his sentence exceeds the

statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Reale
must show that in light of the governing criteria, the

was

considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or objectives of criminal
punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id. An appellate court, "[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence ...

consider[s] the defendant's entire sentence."

State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726

(2007). The reviewing court will "presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement." Id.
Mr. Reale submits that, because the district court did not give adequate
consideration to mitigating factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
excessive considering any view of the facts.

Specifically, the district court did not

adequately consider Mr. Reale's low risk to reoffend. Mr. Reale's Static-99R actuarial
risk assessment, administered during his psychosexual evaluation conducted by
Dr. Linda Hatzenbuehler, resulted in a total score of -2, "which places him in the low risk
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for being charged or convicted of
Static-99R." (Conf.

offense

solely on

, pp.10, 17.)

The psychosexual evaluation also involved the Stable-2007 and Risk for Sexual
Violence Protocol (RSVP) instruments, which "assess dynamic (changeable) aspects of
an individual's life that have been found to be related to or prevent sex offense
recidivism." (Conf. Exs., p.20.) "Mr. Reale scored in the Moderate range on the Stable2007. Combining his Static-99R score (Low) with his Stable-2007 score results in a
combined rating of Low risk to reoffend." (Conf. Exs., p.21 (emphasis in original).) The
RSVP, which does not yield a risk score or probability of reoffending, showed that, while
Mr. Reale had the treatment issue of being a victim of sexual abuse himself and having
some deviate sexual interests, also had protective factors or assets including "his lack
of a significant criminal history, his long term intimate relationship and the fact that he is
not a substance abuser nor does he currently meet criteria for a serious mental illness."
(Conf. Exs., pp.25-26.)
In sum, the psychosexual evaluation concluded that "Mr. Reale's risk level falls
within the Low range for re-offense based upon static factors. Adding dynamic factors,
his risk level resulted in his risk range remaining in the low risk range for re-offense."
(Conf. Exs., p.26.) Although his risk "is highest for young females known to him" and
his "contact with young children should be supervised," Mr. Reale "does not appear to
be a risk to the community at large." (Conf. Exs., p.26.)
While the district court noted "from the static and other dynamic factors that
Dr. Hatzenbuehler relied upon in her testing that statistically [Mr. Reale] would be a low
risk to reoffend," the district court also noted that "those dynamic factors and those
static factors upon which those actuarial measures are made do not consider the level
17

risk when

is acknowledgement that such similar behavior has occurred in the

" (Tr., p.54, Ls.2-10.) However, the Stable-2007 assessment of dynamic factors
actually considered Mr. Reale's "Deviant Sexual Preferences," including that "[h]e
appears to have had more than one deviant victim (under the age of 14)." (Conf. Exs.,
p.12.) The psychosexual evaluation also mentioned several past episodes of reported
"similar behavior" in its account of Mr. Reale's sexual history. (See Conf. Exs., pp.1415.)

Thus, the psychosexual evaluation, when it assessed Mr. Reale's static and

dynamic risk factors, considered his reported prior sexual behavior. Mr. Reale was still
found to be a low risk to reoffend.
Mr.

(Conf. Exs., p.26.)

low risk to reoffend should have resulted in a

Adequate consideration of
sentence.

Additionally, the district court did not give adequate consideration to Mr. Reale's
own history of being a victim of sexual abuse. When Mr. Reale was four years old, his
female babysitter molested him. (Conf. Exs., p.14.) She made him perform oral sex on
her.

(Conf. Exs., p.14.) Mr. Reale could not specifically recall how many times the

molestations happened, but indicated he had flashbacks to the molestations during his
sexual conduct with M.S. (Cont. Exs., p.14.) Mr. Reale's own history of being a victim
of sexual abuse does not excuse his behavior, but it does help explain it. Adequate
consideration of Mr. Reale's own history of being a victim of sexual abuse should have
resulted in a lesser sentence.
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Reale's physical health
problems. Mr. Reale served in the United States Marine Corps from 1965 to 1969, and
did one tour in Vietnam. (Conf. Exs., pp.13, 40-41.) While in Vietnam, he was exposed
to Dioxin (Agent Orange).

(Conf. Exs., p.41.) Mr. Reale was finally diagnosed with

Dioxin poisoning in the early 1990s, and since then he has received 100% VA disability
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, p.1

)

The Dioxin poisoning caused Mr.

diabetes, peripheral artery disease, and blindness.

(Conf.

, p.41.)

to
Mr. Reale is

legally blind. (Conf. Exs., p.41.) Adequate consideration of Mr. Reale's physical health
problems should have resulted in a lesser sentence.
Further, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Reale's grief over the
illness and death of his wife. Mr. Reale married his wife, Dixie Reale, in 1967, and they
had two children. (Conf. Exs., p.40.) Before the conduct underlying the instant offense
occurred, Ms. Reale had been ill for over a year.

(See Tr., p.51, Ls.8-9.) Mr. Reale

struggled to get her medical attention, but "she was a very stubborn lady" and he would
not argue with her. (Tr., p.51, Ls.9-13.) Mr. Reale told the district court, "It wasn't until
she couldn't get up off the floor that she finally agreed that she had to go to the hospital
to be checked."

(Tr., p.51, Ls.14-16.)

Unfortunately, Ms. Reale passed away from

cancer about a month after Mr. Reale's arrest for the instant offense. (See Conf. Exs.,
p.40; R., pp.16-17.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Reale's counsel related that Mr. Reale had "spent
a very significant period of time in jail missing the last weeks of his wife's life, having not
had a memorial service or funeral for his wife at this point."

(Tr., p.48, Ls.22-25.)

Mr. Reale told the district court, "I have yet to mourn my wife. I've been mourning her
since she went to the hospital, and it's already, what, five or six months, seven months."
(Tr., p.51, L.24 - p.52, L.3.) Even though the district court told Mr. Reale, "I'm aware of
the stress that you were under with respect to your wife and the illness" (Tr., p.56, Ls.24 ), adequate consideration of Mr. Reale's grief over the sickness and death of his wife
should have resulted in a lesser sentence.
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the district

did not

factors, the sentence imposed by the district court is
the facts.

consider
""'J~-.,~

mitigating

considering any view of

Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed Mr. Reale's

unified sentence of fifteen years, with three years fixed.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Mr. Reale respectfully requests that this Court vacate the
district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost wages and remand
the matter for the entry of a new restitution order reducing the amount of restitution
awarded to the Shepards by $3315.68. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this
Court

the district court's restitution award of $3315.68 for Ms. Shepard's lost

wages and remand the matter for a new determination of the amount of Ms. Shepard's
lost wages proximately caused by Mr. Reale's criminal conduct.
Mr. Reale also respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that his case be remanded to
the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 1st day of July, 2014.

BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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